

FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION

In this chapter I shall develop a discourse that has as its theme the discourses of the preceding four chapters: a meta-discourse. It treats the question of methods, of knowing how to advance by way (*meta-hodos*) of theory, of practice, of poiesis, until the determination of the method of philosophy of liberation is arrived at and a model of the process of its critical discourse is proposed (5.9.4).

5.1 SCIENCE

5.1.1


Everyday comprehension and interpretation of the world is naive, not critical; it always gives beings their obvious sense. Nevertheless, it is critical, at least relatively, with regard to interpretations of peoples called primitive. Thus, for the Aztecs the sun is the god Huitzilopochtli; for the present-day average person the sun is a star around which the earth revolves constantly. For its part, scientific interpretation is critical with respect to the everyday interpretation of the average person because it can describe the sun in a much fuller and more precise manner. It can explain that the heat we receive from the sun is due to the combustion of 800,000 tons of hydrogen per second. Having a critical view of everyday beings presupposes digression from everyday ingenu-

ousness and access to the level where the scientist functions as scientist.

5.1.2

The scientific method, traditionally, was defined as an explicative and demonstrative process. In his *Analytics* Aristotle explains the demonstrative process (apodictical: etymologically, a "showing from") starting from principles. Kant divides the

DIAGRAM 9



sciences into analytical, tautological, properly demonstrative (formal sciences such as logic and mathematics), and those that proceed by synthetic *a priori* judgments. These last-named sciences are determined by their principles, which define the conditions for the possibility of *a priori* scientific knowledge, with regard to both the categories of understanding and the materiality

of experience. Today facts are interpreted by theories that lead to explications or conclusions with varying degrees of probability or falsifiability.*

5.1.3

The factual sciences have as their sphere of activity the ontic level of what are semantically referred to as natural beings (4.1.2.2). Their point of departure is facts. A fact is the real constitutive note of a thing by which it is actualized or appears in the world. A datum, on the other hand, is the enunciation of that note or the real phenomenal aspect of a thing insofar as it is real; it is the enunciation of a real moment. Thus the factual sciences (fact in Latin is *factum*) take into account as an essential category of their discourse real substantivity, be it physical (4.1.3), living (4.1.4), or even human (4.1.5)—insofar as the human is natural, not cultural or historical (5.3).

5.1.4

The scientific process starts from the fact as a phenomenon. The fact is, then, an object of experience through perception or through direct or indirect proof. Science does not concern itself with the fact as a fact but with the explication, the *why*, of the fact.

5.1.5

The science model proposed in diagram 9 is a purely pedagogical simplification of the scientific process. It begins with a fact that must be confronted (*c*) with an *a priori* theoretical framework or body of existent theories (*t*). Interpreted at first in its everyday sense, the fact, as representative of similar facts (a case to be studied), is then confronted (*c'*) with reality in order to gather data to be able to interpret the fact precisely, scientifically. One discovers or does not discover a *problem*. If there is a problem, it is defined clearly and precisely in an appropriate scientific

*Falsifiability is a concept developed by Karl R. Popper (*The Logic of Scientific Discovery* [Harper & Row, 1970] *Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach* [Oxford University Press, 1972]).

code. The problem is then confronted ($C^{I'}$) with a theory, with its laws, and with the totality of its systematic structures. From this confrontation a hypothesis for scientific investigation may or may not be worked out. If it is, the hypothesis is then confronted ($C^{II'}$)—by means of appropriate techniques, which implement in this decisive phase the specific scientific case method—with the fact, with other facts, and with their concrete and real system. From the techniques of explication, confrontation, and proof—the experimental method—a conclusion of explication must follow. If the hypothesis is verified, within varying degrees of probability, it is integrated (i) into the theory, which by this very integration is somewhat modified (t'), either because it has been corroborated and thus has more force, or because it has been complemented, or because it has been negated (shown to be false). In all instances t' gives feedback to the theoretical framework and becomes the new theoretical framework for the next scientific investigation.

5.1.6

The principle of scientific, factual logic is no longer the principle of causality, at least not in its naive classic sense. It could be said that real substantivity, by its very constitutive structure, demands as principle the *real* coimplication of data and facts of experience. Coimplication as a principle and substantivity as a category differentiate factual sciences from purely formal sciences, whose proper sphere is abstract: they are concerned with logical beings or abstract quantity, having as their own category pure systematization and as their principle *formal* coimplication (not to be confused with real coimplication). Inasmuch as they are tautologous or analytical, the formal sciences cannot truly be called sciences of the real but only demonstrative or apodictic *a priori* methods. They are instrumental meta-discourses, scientific mediations.

5.2 DIALECTIC

5.2.1

If science is explication of the data of experience by theories, there is another methodical sphere that is not apodictic or scien-

tific (epistemic), but "monstrative" or deictic, a sphere that—because it is the origin itself—cannot depart from (*apo-*) anything anterior, as science does. In this strict sense, dialectic goes through (*dia-*) various ontic horizons from totality (2.5) to totality until it arrives at the fundamental one. Aristotle in his *Topics* showed that dialectic was a method beyond the scientific because it could question the very principles of science derived from everyday opinions (*ta endoxa*). For his part Marx, in the few pages on the method of political economy in the *Grundrisse*, describes the dialectical method as the movement that ascends "from the abstract to the concrete" (*vom Abstrakten zum Konkreten anzusteigen*), until it reaches the simplest category (*die einfache Kategorie*), which is nothing less than the foundation of totality.

5.2.2

The proper sphere of dialectic is the ontological—that is, the passage from one horizon of beings to another until it reaches its foundation. On the semantic level dialectic refers to concrete systems having as a point of departure (or of arrival, if one prefers) the everyday world on its acritical level. The category proper to the dialectical method is totality. Its principle is that of identity and difference—that is, the dialectical method starts from the very principle of science. It can think about the presuppositions of all scientific theory and it does so from the world, from the political, sexual, pedagogical, economic levels. It can think of nature itself as a moment in the history of the world; it can question the totality of science. The ultimate presuppositions are the theme of dialectic.

5.2.3

The scientific process begins with theory and explains its results; it is explicative. The dialectical process, with regard to sciences, begins with theories or with science as a totality and raises itself to their historical, social, or economic presuppositions. It raises itself from the abstract (science) to the concrete (practical or poetic totalities; 3.1-4.4). It does not demonstrate the foundation; but it shows it as first, through a *reductio ad absurdum*, its corollaries, its final coherence in the identity of the

system as totality in which all differences (beings, parts, functions) recover their ultimate meaning.

5.2.4

The dialectical method can be used in all types of discourse, be it political, sexual, pedagogical, or antifetishist, or in the elucidation of the sciences of nature, semiotics, economics, or technologico-aesthetics. It is, moreover, the ontological method of philosophy. Every horizon is the being that grounds everything included in its sphere. It is a critical method with respect to which the scientific method is often as ingenuous as the average person is with respect to the scientist. We have reached a fourth level of discourse: after the one of the more primitive culture, the one of the contemporary average person, and the one of the scientist, there is the one of the dialectician. Each is naive with respect to the one that follows it and critical with respect to the one that precedes it.

5.3 THE ANALECTICAL MOMENT

5.3.1

As we have seen in 2.4, exteriority is the sphere located beyond the foundation of totality. The sphere of exteriority is real only because of the existence of human freedom (2.4.6). The merely natural substantivity of a person (4.1.5) acquires here all its uniqueness, its proper indetermination, its essence of bearing a history, a culture; it is a being that freely and responsibly determines itself; it is person, face, mystery. The analectical* refers to the real human fact by which every person, every group or people (3.4.6), is always situated "beyond" (*ano-*) the horizon of totality. Negative dialectic is no longer enough. The analectical moment is the support of new unfoldings. The analectical moment opens us to the metaphysical sphere (which is not the ontic one of

*Through derived from the Greek particle *ano-*, I prefer the spelling "analectic," parallel with ana-economic, ana-Oedipus, etc. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (Viking, 1977) and *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

the factual sciences or the ontological one of negative dialectic), referring us to the other. Its proper category is exteriority. The point of departure for its methodical discourse (a method that is more than scientific or dialectic) is the exteriority of the other. Its principle is not that of identity but of separation, distinction.

5.3.2

The analectical moment of the metaphysical dialectical method whose exercise and concrete development is practical, poetic, and scientifically critical on the level of the human sciences (but not on the level of factual natural sciences where there is no metaphysical exteriority but only physical substantivity) follows a certain sequence, already described somewhat in the process of revelation and communication in proximity (4.2.5.2). In the first place, totality is laid open to question by the provocative (apocalyptic) appeal of the other. To know how to listen to the word of the other (2.4.5) is to have an ethical conscience (2.6.2); if one cannot interpret adequately that word, because it bursts in from beyond the foundation, one can simply accept it out of respect for the person (2.4.8). To know how to risk one's life in order to fulfill the demands of the protest of the oppressed and throw oneself into praxis for them (2.6.7) is part of the process of the analectical moment. Theory is not sufficient in analectics. Speculation is the essential constitution in science and dialectic. Inasmuch as the ethical acceptance of the entreaty of the oppressed and the mediation of praxis is necessary in the analectical moment, that praxis is its first, primordial constitution, the precondition for the possibility of comprehension and clarification, which is the fruit of having effectively and really reached out to exteriority (the only adequate sphere for the exercise of a critical consciousness).

5.3.3

The analectical moment is thus a criticism and a surmounting of the merely negative dialectical method. It does not deny it, just as dialectic does not deny science but simply assumes it, completes it, and gives it its just and real value. The negative dialectical method of Marcuse, Adorno, or even Bloch is naive with respect

to the positive criticism of the utopia of the political exteriority offered by the peripheral peoples, the working-class woman, the oppressed youth, and the dependent societies. All the methods to be described subsequently are defined by the analectical moment, without which all method is only scientific. The scientific is reduced to what is natural fact; natural fact is reduced in turn to the logical or the mathematical; and this, finally, becomes debased in scientism (5.7.3)—extremely naive and extremely dangerous.

5.3.4

The analectical moment is the *affirmation* of exteriority; it is not only the denial of the denial of the system from the affirmation of the totality. It is the overcoming of totality but not only as the actuality of what is in potency in the system. It is the overcoming of totality from internal transcendentalism (2.4.8)—from exteriority that has never been within. To affirm exteriority is to realize what is impossible for the system (there being no potency for it); it is to realize the new, what has not been foreseen by the totality, that which arises from freedom that is unconditioned, revolutionary, innovative.

5.4 PRACTICE

5.4.1

Dialectic in its positive sense or "ana-dialectic" permits us to open ourselves to methods that not only are not scientific but are not even theoretical (because analectic is a method whose point of departure is an ethical choice and a concrete historical praxis). This is of great importance because without it one would not be able to describe the epistemological level of the human sciences (which retain analogies with the factual sciences but are distinct because natural beings are not human beings—beings with history, culture, and freedom). The practical method to which I refer is that of politics, not as political science (5.6.1), but as knowledge of *how* to operate practically on the level of public, social, governmental, trade union, or military decision-making. It is the

practical method of politics as responsibility, as the responsibility of the citizen or the professional politician. The habit of knowing how to decide politically was called by the Greeks *fronesis* (*prudentia* in Latin). We have already distinguished between practical and poetical; here we are dealing with the methodical rationality of decisions that one must know how to make (*orthos logos praktikos*, said Aristotle).

5.4.2

Practical decisions are taken not only in the area of politics but also in sexuality, pedagogy, and on the level of antifetishism. Their point of departure is, passively, the appeal of the other (the oppressed as exteriority); operatively, it is the denial of denial (negation of oppression), and affirmation of exteriority. The essential category of this method is, negatively (metaphysically), that of exteriority; affirmatively and operatively it is that of liberation (and not now the mere freedom of Kant). The principle of the practical method is the principle of analogy (which includes the principle of distinction, passively, and the principle of innovation, creatively). It concerns an operative logic that semantically refers to political, sexual, pedagogical, and other decisions.

5.4.3

The model of a process of practical decision differs, evidently, from scientific (5.1) or poetical (5.5) method. The principles or fundamental criteria of that model express either the prevailing existential *projecto* (the *telos* of classical thinkers) or the entreaty of exteriority; in any case, they concern the strategic goals of practical action, whether or not one has explicit consciousness of them. The strategic level is the light that clarifies (or beclouds, as in the case of Machiavellianism) the entire process that follows. Those goals determine the *case* as a *problem* to solve.

It is here, as also in posterior phases of the model, that a matter of great importance must be well understood. The practical, political person of action must turn to the sciences (factual, formal, and human) to resolve more adequately the question of one's con-

sciousness of one's principles, unequivocal ways to define one's problems, maneuver with alternative hypotheses, and so forth. In all these moments it can be very useful for that person to know and make use of systems theory, the mathematics of sets, computer science, or cybernetics, but keeping in mind that this model is not an application of pure science to praxis but a utilization that realizes the praxis of that which serves it from science. This discourse is essentially practical, not a concrete level of science.

5.4.4

The essential moment of the process of practical decision is found in the moment of *deliberation*. Classical thinkers spoke of a practical argument or syllogism in which the principle was applied (*applicatio* or *Anwendung*) to the concrete case. That is why the Greeks and Latins took pains to detail the ethical makeup of this essential moment of praxis. In the first place, it was necessary to have a good view, a good *coup d'oeil* ("clinical eye"), of the real situation (*aisthesis*); a careful use of memory (history, analogous past experiences, human sciences); intuition of allied or enemy forces (*ratio particularis* proper to the cogitative faculty); discipline in knowing how to submit with docility to the real; serendipity (*sollertia*); realistic or practical sense (*ratio*); perspicuity or aptitude for foreseeing resources that will be necessary in the future; circumspection or a looking around that does not neglect details; and caution or precaution in knowing how to suspect and distrust. Given these conditions, one can choose the tactical means of execution. Decision is thus a desired practical judgment, a judged desire.

5.4.5

Contemporary sciences have developed a whole methodological implementation based on certain techniques that can help one learn to manage an immense number of variables, construct models that permit the evaluation of a great number of hypothetical alternatives, and consider their results by means of very precise approximations. Nevertheless, one must be clearly aware that the best computer cannot replace the fourteen thousand million

neurons (with up to two hundred thousand connections of each one with the rest) situated in the human cerebral cortex alone. The method for the best practical decision is practical. It can use scientific means, but they must be integrated into a practical discourse that turns to science when it is considered useful, as it is considered useful, and insofar as it is considered useful. The practitioners of mathematical scientism are known to be the worst politicians. To manipulate beings of reason is not the same thing as to respect persons who conceal themselves in the mystery of their exteriority.

5.4.6


After making decisions, it is necessary to plan their implementation, with all the means that science and technology offer today to the practical person. Finally, the decision is executed and evaluated. The effected practical work is made a reality either to corroborate the system in force or to inaugurate a new order. In the latter case, the work is revolutionary and liberating. For its part, the correct evaluation of the executed decision modifies the fundamental practical criterion to which one resorts in future decision-making.

5.5 POIETICS

5.5.1

We have now seen in a very general sense what work, production, technology, and design are. In fact, poiesis or productive work or manufacture of artifacts has a projective method of production. It is projective because it deals with foresight or future realization of an artifact that does not yet have reality. Theory discovers what beings "already" are; poiesis produces beings that are "not yet." Thus the proper sphere of poiesis is the natural or material ontic, as a point of departure; but it refers semantically to artifacts or the cultural world. Its proper category is that of the formal coherence of the artifacts; its operative principle is that of poietic projectionality.

DIAGRAM 10



5.5.2

It is erroneous to think that pure science (a in diagram 10), beginning with its own exigencies and by an unknown principle of expansion, itself applies its own conclusions, and technology is its concrete creation. In this hypothesis c would be created by a by means of an applied movement b . On the contrary, it is the technical or technological discourse (a') that, in the face of a difficulty, limitation, or ambiguity, seizes upon (b'), for technical reasons, to use scientific conclusions or theories (c'). The process of the technological utilization of science (d') does not start from a scientific intention but, on the contrary, from a technical decision. We shall see to what extent alternative 1 is ideological. In reality, techniques or concrete technologies have impelled sciences in modern times to look for new technical solutions, starting from new theories. And inasmuch as practical principles are included in those of poetics, politics will not be absent from the very origin of sciences, even of those that claim to be "pure," at least in the choice of their themes.

5.5.3

The model of the technological process is assumed under that of design, which by including all the difficulties of the technological and esthetic model will permit us to discover the projectional productive sense of the poietic method (*recta ratio factibilium*, as it is said in Latin). As before, I summarize the process very briefly. The model of design has a double framework of reference: (1) projective criteria (which include as implied elements certain theoretical and practical moments) and (2) requirements of the present system—prevailing criteria—and requirements coming from exteriority—critical criteria.

5.5.4

From everydayness a work is proposed for design and it is interpreted as a possible *case* and defined as such with precision. The case is confronted with reality, whence are obtained data that permit a *problem* to be defined. When it is confronted with projective criteria, there begins the phase of the study of various alternative *hypotheses*. When one of them is chosen, it is specifically formalized as a *proyecto* to be undertaken. The production of what was projected and its evaluation close the process, whose conclusions are now integrated into the projective criteria and whose functioning comes to modify reality. If it has been an answer to appeals from exteriority, it is constituted as a new culture invented in the service of the oppressed—a revolution in technology, art, or design.

5.6 HUMAN SCIENCES

5.6.1

Methodical passage between the factual and human (not just social) sciences is effected through the analectical moment, which permits an integrative analysis of the *sui generis* variable of exteriority or freedom in its metaphysical sense such as we have described it above. The freedom of the other is not an additional variable; it is a variable of distinct substantivity, constitution, and significance. From exteriority arises the whole practical (political,

sexual, pedagogical, fetishist) and poetical (technological, esthetic, design) ambit, the cultural historical world. In this manner the natural fact now has as a counterpart the cultural historical fact. These facts do not depend on human nature (taken in its merely vegetative, animal, precultural substantivity—though, in a certain sense, that is a mere abstraction because everything in the human person is cultural and historical). These facts depend on a cultural history; they are objects of sciences whose methods must incorporate essential moments of distinction. They are not natural factual sciences but human factual sciences.

5.6.2

Unlike practical or poetical methods, in the human sciences it is a question of theoretical methods, thus of sciences, but of sciences whose objects are not natural beings but human beings. Their ambit is not only ontic but also metaphysical; their semantic reference is the human being in whom freedom is a reality; their point of departure is a fact, but an ambiguous fact. The essential categories are those of totality or social structure, exteriority (passively), and liberation (as an operative category). Their principle is that of structural complication but equally that of analogy in the description of new historical practico-poietic orders. Neither the political sciences (whether sociology, law, political science, etc.), the psychological sciences (from individual to social psychology, psychiatry, etc.), the pedagogical sciences (didactic, etc.), history, communication sciences, nor economics can use the model appropriate for factual sciences (diagram 9). One must introduce the dialectical moment (5.2) to know how to situate each fact in its context or conditioning totality, and the analectical moment (5.3) to know how to detect the dysfunctional appeals that the oppressed continually launch from the exteriority of the established system.

5.6.3

For this reason, the model of the human sciences, and even more that of the social sciences, has as its proper component an ethico-political option. When the factual and human sciences are identified without more ado, this means that the only horizon of

study is the horizon of the totality in force. Functionalism is a clear example of this identification. By eliminating the dialectical and analectical moments, human science, with the pretense of scientific authenticity, has fallen into ideological scientism.

5.7 IDEOLOGICAL METHODS

5.7.1

The culture of the center has accustomed us to opposition between ideology and science. Where there is science, there cannot be ideology. This exclusion is itself an ideology; the totality of a methodical, theoretical, scientific discourse can be ideological not only because of its intrinsic development but also because of what it attempts, its point of departure, its *proyecto*, or the fact of serving as mediation for a context that explains it and gives it significance. Thus even factual science and dialectical method, human sciences and practical or poietic methods—all can be ideological. We shall see in what situation every human act (theoretical, practical, poietical, and their respective methods) and their products (be they ideas, words, signs, forms, decisions, artifacts, etc.) can be ideological.

5.7.2

All meaningful mediation—semiotics—is ideology when it conceals and thereby justifies the practical domination of one person over another (on the political, erotic, pedagogical, or fetishist levels). That is, all theory or theoretical meaning, all practice or practical meaning, all poiesis or poietical meaning, that serves as concealment for domination is ideological. Thus science, practice, technology, art, design, and so forth, can be ideological. So we need neologisms—scientism, technologism, aestheticism, politicism, eroticism, pedagogicism—to express the ideological position of the issues and methods that are our present concern.

5.7.3

Ideology is the ensemble of semiotic expressions that justify or conceal domination; when they are methodical, they justify it

more completely. The ideological function in its essence is the relationship of the sign or signifier as justification of a dominating praxis. When it is scientific, it is more ideological than ever. For example, when a science prescind from its social, economic, political (dialectical) conditioning, when it forgets that its mathematical formulas can help the soldier hit the target in Vietnam with incendiary bombs (i.e., when it does not listen to the anecdotal demands of the poor), that science becomes scientism. It is a science that believes that, just as it is, it has absolute autonomy; it is valid everywhere; its themes have originated from the internal exigencies of scientific discourse, which can be imitated by all the countries of the world as pure, uncontaminated, neutral mediations. Oscar Varsavsky and Orlando Fals Borda have exposed the dangers of scientism. Althusser falls into error by not discovering the concrete ideological sense of the science of the center.

5.7.4

Science and technology are necessary for the process of liberation of peripheral nations and peripheral, popular classes. But the worst enemies of intelligence and development are the pseudoscientists who import supposedly uncontaminated science. Their scientism rests on that supposition, and on the disequilibrium it introduces rests the incapacity for viable solutions. Also implicated are technologists who preach the necessity of importing technology (with which they introduce foreign techniques, as well as practico-political, economic, and poietic criteria that foster and consolidate neocolonialism in the underdeveloped world periphery). What is needed is redesign and innovation with criteria that are practical and poietic, national, congruent, and popular. Methodical ideologies are the most ideological because they scientifically ground the praxis of domination. Scientists who do not succeed in really joining their science to the effective and dialectical conditioning of politics to discover its relative autonomy and who do not know how to hear clearly the demands that the oppressed launch continually against the system are pseudoscientists. They practice science, it is true, but only to conceal and justify the domination that the center and oppressive classes exercise over peripheral nations and oppressed peoples.

5.8 CRITICAL METHODS

5.8.1

With regard to the factual sciences, and in their proper exercise, one can have a critical consciousness of themes, analyses, and the use that can be made of results. All this permits scientists who have a politico-ethical consciousness to give a responsible account of their actions. This critical consciousness allows them to avoid being pseudoscientists, but it does not constitute their science an intrinsically critical science: by having as object of its method natural beings, not human beings as such, its critique is dialectical (because of its assumptions, as we have said) and not intrinsic. On the contrary, in practical (political, etc.) and poetical (technological, etc.) methods in the human sciences and, as we shall see shortly, in philosophy itself, critique is intrinsic to the specific object of the method because it deals with human beings. If only the dialectical totality is taken as ultimate horizon, critique can only and at most affirm the *proyecto* of the system. If, on the contrary, one begins with the demand for justice from exteriority, the same functional totality is placed in question by the exigencies implicit in the construction of a new, future, utopian order, one that is already an incipient *proyecto* of the people.

5.8.2

Political Machiavellianism or fascism, erotic "Don Juanism," pedagogy that dominates educational systems, imitative technologism, the pseudoscience of sociological functionalism—that is, establishing the system itself as alone, sufficient, fundamental, and absolute—constitute method in ideology, in alienation of intelligence and the mediation of domination. Opposed to this is a socio-economics that begins with a theory of dependence such as that of Samir Amin. It includes a sociology of liberation such as that proposed by Fals Borda, a psychology such as that of Frantz Fanon, which applies diverse principles so as to study the pathologies of dominated countries or of oppressed and popular classes, a history that describes the process in which the poor are the pro-

tagonists. It includes a political science that unmask the imperial state (vis-a-vis the powerful National Security Council, the Pentagon, the Department of State, the transnational corporations, and the CIA, the Congress of the United States is as helpless as was the Roman Senate before the Emperor Augustus). And it includes a technology and design that formulate criteria of national industrial liberation against the pretentious "universal" technology and styling of the transnationals (which seek maximum profit for the producer as well as maximum capital and technology so as to diminish to a minimum the use of labor, as they squander and aggressively destroy nonrenewable resources). A critical science is authentically science because it can give an account of totality with the most critical consciousness possible in this social formation in which we live. Only those who can interpret the phenomena of the system in the light of exteriority can discover reality with greater lucidity, acuity, and profundity. Only critical methods, those which are constituted in an anadialectical process (from exteriority, *ano-*, is produced the unfolding, *dia-* of the comprehension of a new horizon, *logos*), are today qualified to undertake substantive investigations in favor of peripheral nations, popular classes.

5.9 PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION

5.9.1 *Status Questionis*

5.9.1.1 The method of philosophy is analectically theoretical; intrinsically it is neither practical nor poietic although it is conditioned by both. The negative ontological or dialectical method is not sufficient. Besides, when it is taken to be that of first philosophy (philosophy of the praxis of liberation; 6.3.1), it justifies the system in force and grounds all ideology. The method of philosophy of liberation knows that politics—the politics of the exploited—is the first philosophy because politics is the center of ethics as metaphysics (ethico-metaphysical exteriority [2.4 and 5.3] is concretized in a privileged way in politics; 3.1), thus surpassing mere ontology (2.4.9). Between ideological science or scientism (pseudoscience) and critical science there exists an analogical difference similar to the one between philosophy of

domination, of the system—ontology—and philosophy of liberation.

5.9.1.2 In the periphery, especially in Latin America, besides ontological philosophies (such as phenomenology, existentialism, etc.), there are philosophies that, absolutizing one of the possible accesses to reality, remain in an ideological position. In the first place, an analytical philosophy that claims that by studying logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, or philosophy of science, it has already accounted for all that philosophy can think of, reduces the capacity of philosophical reflection to thinking beings of reason. It prevents the clarification of practical and poetical reality; it castrates philosophy by depriving it of the possibility of political and historical criticism. It is necessary to put analytical philosophy into a political and dialectical setting that will open it to the wide world of the reality of oppressed nations, classes, and persons.

5.9.1.3 In the second place, Marxism, by its theory of dependence allows one to discover the theft by the center of the surplus value (of products) earned by the periphery, and to distinguish the social formations of the center from those of the periphery. But it is also necessary to locate the theory of dependence in a real, concrete, historical setting. Specificity or national peripheral exteriority (3.1.3) is explained not only by the fact of undergoing imperialist domination but by a national history. Without this enrichment, Marxism degenerates into a new ideology, especially if it is not historically joined with the popular classes.

5.9.1.4 In the third place, numerous historical philosophical analyses of the periphery, with immense positive material, need a theoretical setting or a strong structure of hermeneutic categories. Historical interpretation without a precise categorical framework can fall into an historicism without a guiding hypothesis and, above all, without conclusions that elucidate a national and popular praxis of liberation. The pseudoscience of an analytical philosophy without political framework, a Marxism without historical background and without real links with the people at their level of consciousness, and history without a theoretical framework are the three deviations into which today philosophy in the periphery can fall and does fall.

5.9.1.5 Philosophy of liberation claims to take up the posi-

tions considered essential above. It does so by an overcoming, but not eclectic, posture. It claims to pursue a discourse that organically includes the discourses detailed above, without destroying their nature but rather giving them their authentic sense. It further claims to overcome, historico-philosophically, Greek physiologism, medieval theologism, and the modern scientific mentality of the center as it works on an anthropology, a philosophy that has as its central pivot the person as free, as exteriority, as person, as oppressed. For this reason, politics in its ethico-metaphysical sense is its very heart. Of course I mean the popular politics of the exploited classes.

5.9.2 Problems and Hypothesis of Philosophy of Liberation

5.9.2.1 Of all the facts of daily experience in the world, philosophy of liberation has interpreted one as the fact that can gestate a new discourse. Since about 1965, there have been some Latin American philosophers who have asked themselves whether it was possible to do philosophy in underdeveloped countries. A little later the question was put another way: Is it possible to philosophize authentically in a dependent and dominated culture? That is, the facts of underdevelopment and then of dependence and the fact of philosophy appeared to be mutually exclusive or inclusive only with difficulty. Those facts reshaped themselves into a problem, into the central problem of philosophy of liberation: Is a Latin American philosophy possible? With time it grew into: Is a Latin American, African, or Asian philosophy of the peripheral world possible?

5.9.2.2 Peruvian Augusto Salazar Bondy, now deceased, answered courageously: No! No, because a dominated culture is one in which the ideology of the dominator has been adopted by the dominated—by the colonized, Memmi would say. The problem evanesces with a flat denial. Nevertheless, there is another possibility, an affirmative possibility. It has been put forward as a working hypothesis.

5.9.2.3 This hypothesis, under the thematic of a "philosophy of liberation," was launched by a group of thinkers from Argentina. The hypothesis is as follows: It appears possible to

philosophize in the periphery—in underdeveloped and dependent nations, in dominated and colonial cultures, in a peripheral social formation—only if the discourse of the philosophy of the center is not imitated, only if another discourse is discovered. To be different, this discourse must have another point of departure, must think other themes, must come to distinctive conclusions by a different method. This is the hypothesis.

The present work claims to be an outline of what would have to be the first theoretical, *provisional* philosophical framework of such a discourse. That is, it is necessary not only not to hide but actually to start from the center/periphery, dominator/dominated, totality/exteriority dissymmetry, and from there to rethink everything that has been thought until now. And, what is more, it is necessary to think what has never been thought: the process of the liberation of dependent and peripheral countries. Its theme is the praxis of liberation. The option for that praxis is the beginning of a philosophical protodiscourse. Politics introduces ethics, which introduces philosophy.

5.9.3 *Theoretical Philosophical Framework*

5.9.3.1 This book is a first, a *remote* and *provisional*, attempt to describe briefly some *possible* theses of what a theoretical philosophical framework of philosophy of liberation must be. That theoretical framework must include the essential categories and the necessary moments of the discourse that is established with those categories, never taking leave of reality (of the world and of the cosmos, as nature or culture). This framework is a point of departure of interpretation as interpretation, not of the interpreted.

5.9.3.2 This theoretical framework is itself a discourse, though abstract. We begin its unfolding with history (chap. 1), with description of a fact, philosophy itself in this case, its development in human history. All the other themes of the theoretical framework must be taken into account in this historical description. What is unique in a historical description of philosophy of liberation is the use of categories such as center/periphery, oppressing classes/popular classes. All description will have to


follow a historical method that pursues an ideological/anti-ideological standard of criticism. It is impossible today, for example, to avoid the problem of the imperialist ideology of national security, which justifies the exercise of worldwide geopolitical power.

5.9.3.3 In the second place, the discourse penetrates what may be called metaphysics if it is ethics, or ethics if it is metaphysics (chap. 2), where categories are described—as few as possible but enough—that will permit the continuing discourse to give a structural account of *omnitudo realitatis* (reality in its full sense). Among those categories some have priority. The fundamental one is totality (ontological; 2.2). Of primary importance is exteriority (metaphysical or ethical; 2.4). Proximity (2.1) is explained by exteriority. Mediation (2.3) is on the ontic level (which is not that of substantivity [4.1.3-5], which is cosmic or real). Alienation (2.5) is purely negative, passive. Liberation (2.6) is the operative anadialecical category that needs all the previous ones for its explanation (and we need it to describe the praxis of real historical liberation, which is the central theme of our reflection).

5.9.3.4 In the third place, the discourse accounts for the level that could be called practice (chap. 3). In it there are privileged moments such as politics (3.1) and sexuality (3.2), with pedagogy mediating between them (3.3). Antifetishism (3.4) is a kind of summation, summing up the three previous moments as absolutization or critique of political, erotic, or pedagogical systems. They maintain diverse relationships complicated by exteriority.

5.9.3.5 In the fourth place, poietics (chap. 4) or philosophy of production continues the discourse within (or conditioned by) praxis as the person-to-nature relationship, starting from nature (4.1) and the category of substantivity, so as to open itself to the first sphere of poietics: the functioning of signifiers or signs—semiotics (4.2). Just as pedagogy is mediation between politics and erotics, so economics (4.4) is primordial mediation between practice and poietics or technology (4.3). Politics gives practical criteria to economics; economics gives fundamental criteria to technology or design. Technology (e.g., the Industrial Revolution) conditions economics, which conditions politics. All naive simplification is ideological (4.4.3.6).

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5.9.3.6 The theoretical philosophical framework is completed by reflection on discourse itself, in a methodological meta-discourse. Methods are diverse, depending on the activities that complete them or the objects with which they are concerned. We thus review the factual and formal sciences (5.1), the dialectical or ontological method of totality (5.2), the analectical moment or that of exteriority (5.3), and the practical (5.4) and poetical methods (5.5), which we use to categorize the human sciences (5.6). Methodical alienation is ideology, at its different levels (5.7); its counterpart is critical methodology (5.8).

Among the critical methods that of philosophy of liberation is found. Its method is not operative or productive but theoretical, speculative. In contrast to factual or formal sciences, it concerns itself not only with the ontic ambit but also with the ontological, in contrast to negative dialectical method, it also concerns itself with the metaphysical ambit or that of exteriority. Thus its theme is *omnitudo realitatis*: everything. Its point of departure is an ethico-political option in favor of the oppressed of the periphery: respect for the exteriority of the other; geopolitically and socially speaking, listening to the word of the other. The essential categories it uses in its discourse are described in chapter 2 and 4.1. Its principle is that of analogy (and not only that of identity and difference). The logic of liberation is still to be explicated and published; it becomes more necessary with every passing day.

5.9.4 *A Model for Philosophical Reflection*

5.9.4.1 In the Preface of this work it is stated that this theoretical philosophical framework is directed to the beginner in philosophy of liberation. In effect, its purpose is to be of service to anyone who wants to learn to think according to the progressive stages of philosophy of liberation. For the beginner, then, I propose a model of the phases of its logical development according to the implicit logic of liberation, of thinking about a theme. The philosopher must be able to think of all themes. Nevertheless, in the course of one lifetime the philosopher will be able to think about only a certain number of themes precisely, deeply, and originally. Because themes are infinite and time is short, it is necessary to know how to use time wisely to choose the fundamental themes of the epoch we live in. It is necessary to know how to use time wisely to commit oneself to the struggles of peripheral peoples and oppressed classes. It is necessary to know how to use time wisely in listening to their voices: their proposals, demands, customs, poetry; their successes and failures. It is necessary to know how to use time wisely and put aside secondary themes, those that are fashionable but superficial and unnecessary, those that have nothing to do with the liberation of the oppressed.

5.9.4.2 Something must be said about the criteria for selecting the themes to be thought about. In the first place, the absolute criterion is: to think about a real theme, and among real themes the most essential ones, and among essential themes the most urgent ones, and among urgent themes those that are more transcendent, and among the more transcendent themes those that refer to the peoples who are the most numerous, the most oppressed, the ones on the point of death, a death of hunger, of despair. The political, economic, technological theme is a cycle of themes with which philosophy must occupy itself today. But at the same time it is as important to know how to disqualify false problems as it is to select a viable theme.

Philosophy of the center gives us a wide gamut of false problems with its diversionary tactics and subtleties. Its philosophers sometimes appear to be the court jesters of the system that they entertain and amaze by their witticisms and games of logical sleight of hand. These are the themes of *homo ludens*—while

others are dying! They are the themes of philosophies of language, of word juggling, which reduce to silence the cry of the oppressed. Even the pain of the oppressed they cannot interpret.

Ideological themes must not be treated except to show how and why they are ideological. Phenomenological ontology, a good part of analytical philosophy, and certain dogmatic Marxisms are luxuries or fireworks displays. They are not themes of philosophy of liberation.

Once a theme, a fact, is chosen, one can begin to unfold a precise discourse, at times explanatory, at times demonstrative, and always critical. Its purpose is to let light fall upon an access road to—or, if possible—the highway itself of liberating praxis.

5.9.4.3 The model of the discourse of philosophy of liberation, even though it is a method for theoretical thinking, is analogous to practical or poetical knowledge because it is analectical. The human critical sciences come ever closer in method to philosophy, but philosophy will keep its distance because of the different techniques it uses to explain hypotheses. In our case the *theme* to be thought comes from reality, be it the everydayness of the everyday world or a demand from exteriority. Reality for philosophy of liberation is always—directly, not indirectly—the praxis of liberation and all that impedes or promotes it. Inasmuch as what is most real in reality is praxis, the praxis of the philosopher determines the way of stating the *problem*. If it is interpreted from the ontological exigencies of the system in force, all its thought will be ideological camouflage. If the problem is defined from exigencies of exteriority, it will be a real, critical problem fertile with speculative, operative possibilities. When the problem is defined critically, it is confronted at the same time with the theoretical philosophical framework, in the history of the theme and in the history of philosophy (chap. 1), and confronted with reality through experience and the sciences, from which will arise the hypothesis of philosophical reflection.

5.9.4.4 Once the *hypothesis* is determined, the essential moment of the philosophical method unfolds. First the theme is situated in totality (2.2). Then it is thought through as mediation (2.3). Then it is questioned from exteriority (2.4). Then, negatively, it is or is not judged as alienation (2.5). Finally, the real conditions of possibility of liberation of what is thought (2.6) are

described. The conclusion or explication is the clear discernment of a theme as real (or abstract) fact in all its structure and context.

5.9.4.5 The conclusion, the discerned theme, breaks into reality as illumination of the praxis or poiesis of liberation. The philosophical conclusion fecundates and modifies reality, a transformation that goes toward constituting the history of the world. On the other hand, integrating new criteria into the theoretical philosophical framework also modifies it. The commitment of philosophers to the praxis of liberation and their work in defining a more precise philosophical framework will permit them to take on a new theme with greater resources, clarity, realism, and criticism. Discourse will engender new enthusiasm when its fruits are verified.

5.9.5 *Description, Validity, and Relevance of Philosophy of Liberation*

5.9.5.1 It is difficult to describe what philosophy of liberation is. Even to try to give some reasons for its validity may seem to be a naive, impossible task. Hence I shall propose only a few suggestive, approximative reflections. Philosophy of liberation is a pedagogical activity stemming from a praxis that roots itself in the proximity of teacher-pupil, thinker-people (the organic intellectual, Gramsci would say, "the intellectual in the people"). Although pedagogical, it is a praxis conditioned by political (and also erotic) praxis. Nevertheless, as pedagogical, its essence is theoretical or speculative. Theoretical action, the poietic intellectual illuminative activity of the philosopher, sets out to discover and expose (in the exposition and risk of the life of the philosopher), in the presence of an entrenched system, all moments of negation and all exteriority lacking justice. For this reason it is an analectical pedagogy (2.4 and 5.3) of liberation. That is, it is the magisterium that functions in the name of the poor, the oppressed, the other (2.4.6), the one who like a hostage within the system testifies to the fetishism of its totalization and predicts its death in the liberating action of the dominated. *To think of everything in the light of the provocative word of the people*—the poor, the castrated woman, the child, the culturally dominated youth, the aged person discarded by the consumer society—shouldering infinite responsibility and in the presence of the Infinite is philosophy of

liberation. Philosophy of liberation must be the expression of the most thorough-going critical consciousness possible.

5.9.5.2 If the dialectical method allows one to be able to approach the foundation of scientific knowledge itself, the fact of approaching the exteriority of the system as totality allows one to be able to reach the maximum possible critical consciousness. If philosophy of liberation is the thinking of the praxis of liberation, in militancy, as an organic intellectual with the people, philosophy is transformed into the critique of all critiques, a radical, metaphysical critique beyond its own dialectical critique. Thus philosophy is death—death to everydayness, to the secure naivety of the system. It is risk—the risk of death, for this philosophy emerges, within the system, as a hostage and a witness to a new future order. It clearly formulates provocation—the provocation of the oppressed, but now enhanced by the theoretical comprehension of the structuring of the dominative system.

5.9.5.3 What pertinence does this methodical thinking have? I shall only repeat what I said to a student in Bogotá who asked me in 1975, "What guarantee can I have of the pertinence of this philosophy?" The absolute certitude of $2 + 2 = 4$ no philosophy will ever possess, not because it is not methodical but because the theme it ponders is humankind, its history, the reality of freedom. Nevertheless, there are many factors that bring out its pertinence. Let us look at a few of them.

5.9.5.4 The pertinence of a philosophy can be shown by its negative critical destructive capacity. It would seem that philosophy of liberation has a tremendous destructive potential because it can not only assume critical methods (such as those of analytical philosophy, Marxism, critical theory, etc.) but it can in addition criticize those critical methods, at least from a new angle, from geopolitical world exteriority, from the periphery, from the oppressed.

5.9.5.5 Positively, a philosophy must possess an efficacious theoretical constructive capacity. It would seem that philosophy of liberation achieves the formulation of a minimal theoretical philosophical framework, *though provisory*, that permits it to think the themes that are most urgent for the oppressed periphery, oppressed classes, women, and youth.

5.9.5.6 It would seem that the themes treated by philosophy of liberation are realistic: they clarify the praxis of militants

in the process of liberation of the periphery. Given an explanation of the themes of philosophy of liberation, militants, even the most simple and least educated, better understand their situation, their problems. Enlightenment leads to mobilization. Metaphysically—that is, ethically and psychologically—this is easily understandable.

5.9.5.7 It would seem that the discourse of philosophy of liberation does not contradict itself; it has its own systematization, a logic of coimplication, which is the manifestation of coherence.

5.9.5.8 From a historical, empirical viewpoint, if this philosophy is critical, if it criticizes the system, then this system must criticize it, must persecute it. Philosophers who practice it have been targeted for bombings; they have been dismissed from their universities, expelled from their homelands; they have been condemned to death by the agents of imperialism, facism, and the extreme right.

5.9.5.9 In any case, no philosophy has ever had to justify itself to its own times. Its justification was its clear-sightedness; its clear-sightedness was its operability; its operability was its realism; its realism was the origin of its viability; its viability was the fruit of praxis. The praxis of liberation has been the cause of its unwelcome, its nonacceptance by the system. Exteriority is the unfathomable spring of wisdom, that of the commonplace, dominated, poor peoples. They are the teachers of the wise, and philosophy is wisdom. With Pedro Mir, the Caribbean poet, in his "Countersong to Walt Whitman," we want to sing:

And now,
the hour of countersong has arrived.
We the railroad workers,
we the students,
we the miners,
we the farm laborers,
we the poor of the earth,
the populous of the world,
we are the heroes of daily work,
with our love and our valor,
enamored by hope.